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DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUL 20 AM 11
REVIEWED BY Joan Isenberg DATE 10/5/81
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ENDORSE EXCISION NOTICE ☐
DECLASSIFIED ☑ RELEASABLE ☑
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1. CENTRAL ELECTION COUNCIL HAS HELD MEETINGS JULY 10 AND 11 TO CONSIDER COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. ACCORDING TO NGUYEN DINH XUONG, DEPUTY TO SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR ADMINISTRATION AND ALSO MEMBER OF COUNCIL, COUNCIL HAS ALREADY COMPLETED CONSIDERATION OF CASES AGAINST TEN MINOR TICKETS AND HAS HAD SOME PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST SOME OF MAJOR CANDIDATES. XUONG STATED THAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (PRESUMABLY OFFICE OF ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN) HAS INFORMED HIM THAT THEY WILL MOST LIKELY ACCEPT COUNCIL'S RECOMMENDATIONS.

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2. MINH-LIENG TICKET. XUONG SAID THAT COMPLAINT AGAINST GENERAL "BIG" MINH WAS SUPPORTED BY NO DOCUMENTATION WHATSOEVER, SO THAT CASE THUS FAR RESTS MERELY ON FIVE GENERALS' STATEMENT THAT MINH'S CANDIDACY SHOULD BE REJECTED "FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY". XUONG STATED THAT COUNCIL APPEARS TO HAVE PROVISIONALLY ACCEPTED HIS SUGGESTION TO RECOMMEND THAT ASSEMBLY TAKE ONE OF THREE ACTIONS: (A) REQUEST ARMED FORCES COUNCIL TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION OF COMPLAINT, (B) ASK GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, CHIEF OF JOINT GENERAL STAFF, OR GENERAL LINH QUANG VIEN, MINISTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY, TO APPEAR IN ORDER TO CLARIFY COMPLAINT FOR ASSEMBLY (LATTER BECAUSE BASIS FOR GENERALS' COMPLAINT WAS "NATIONAL SECURITY"), OR (C) REQUEST THAT EITHER CAO VAN VIEN OR LINH QUANG VIEN PROVIDE SUCH CLARIFICATION IN WRITING. XUONG DOES NOT THINK THAT EITHER OF THE TWO GENERALS WOULD AGREE TO APPEAR BEFORE ASSEMBLY. HE WAS UNCERTAIN AS TO WHETHER EITHER GENERAL OR THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL WOULD AGREE TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION OF THEIR COMPLAINT IN WIRITING.

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3. COMPLAINT AGAINST TRAN NGOC LIENG IS BASED ON HIS PREVIOUS FRENCH CITIZENSHIP. ALTHOUGH EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH XUONG INDICATED THAT CENTRAL ELECTION COUNCIL MIGHT FIND THAT LIENG DID NOT QUALIFY BECAUSE HIS VIETNAMESE CITIZENSHIP WAS NOT CONTINUOUS, DURING CONVERSATION JULY 12 XUONG BROUGHT OUT COPY OF FRENCH-VIETNAMESE CONVENTION OF 1955 WHICH HE BELIEVES WOULD SUPPORT LIENG'S CANDIDACY AND THEREFORE NOT DISQUALIFY MINH-LIENG TICKET ON THOSE GROUNDS. ACCORDING TO 1955 CONVENTION, VIETNAMESE ACQUIRING FRENCH CITIZENSHIP AFTER MARCH 8, 1949, WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE HELD VIETNAMESE CITIZENSHIP SINCE BIRTH, UNLESS THEY OPT FOR FRENCH CITIZENSHIP AT THAT TIME (1955) INSTEAD OF VIET-NAMESE CITIZENSHIP. LIENG BECAME NATURALIZED FRENCH CITIZEN IN 1951 BUT DID NOT OPT FOR FRENCH CITIZENSHIP WHEN CONVENTION CAME INTO FORCE IN 1955. BASED ON PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS IN ELECTION COUNCIL, XUONG BELIEVES COUNCIL WILL REJECT COMPLAINT AGAINST LIENG.

4. THIEU-KY TICKET. XUONG BELIEVES THAT COUNCIL WILL EASILY REJECT COMPLAINTS AGAINST THIEU AND KY. HE SAID THAT IN

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PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF COMPLAINTS, COUNCIL TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION ASSEMBLY DEBATE OF ELECTORAL LAW PROVISION THAT CIVIL SERVANTS AND MILITARY MEN WHO ARE CANDIDATES MUST RESIGN OR OBTAIN LEAVE OF ABSENCE. ACCORDING TO XUONG, COUNCIL ACCEPTED INITIAL FACT THAT DIRECTORATE CHAIRMAN AND PRIME MINISTER ARE NOT LEGALLY CIVIL SERVANTS.

5. AU TRUONG THANH. XUONG SAID THAT "IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT" FOR ELECTION COUNCIL TO REJECT COMPLAINT AGAINST THANH CONCERNING HIS ASSOCIATION WITH COMMUNIST GROUPS SINCE THEY HAVE DOCUMENTS WITH HIS SIGNATURE. XUONG ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH IN HIS OWN OPINION IN SENDING THANH'S DOSSIER TO ELECTION COUNCIL, FACT OF HIS ASSOCIATIONS IN PAST EXISTS AND CANNOT BE DENIED..

6. MINOR CANDIDATES. OF TEN LISTS OF MINOR CANDIDATES CONSIDERED JULY 10-11 XUONG STATED THAT COUNCIL WILL RECOMMEND TO ASSEMBLY THAT FOUR BE REJECTED. THESE FOUR ARE (A) NGUYEN DINH LUYEN-TRAN VAN THOAN LIST BECAUSE THOAN HELD FRENCH CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BEFORE MARCH 8, 1949 (SEE ABOVE RE CASE OF LIENG); (B) VU HO

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KHANH-DUONG TRUNG DONG LIST; COUNCIL REJECTED COMPLAINT AGAINST DONG BUT WILL RECOMMEND TO ASSEMBLY THAT DONG IS ACCORDING TO XUONG, "NOT WORTHY"; (C) HOANG NGU NGOC-TRAN VAN XUYEN LIST BECAUSE DOCUMENTATION CONCERNING XUYEN'S MILITARY STATUS WAS RECEIVED AFTER FILING DEADLINE (HE IS 78 YEARS OLD); AND (D) NGUYEN DINH QUAT-TRAN CUU CHAN LIST, ON TWO GROUNDS, THAT QUAT HAS RECORD OF "NEUTRALIST ACTIVITIES" AND CHAN HAS RECORD OF BEING FOUND GUILTY OF VARIOUS ILLEGAL FINANCIAL DEALINGS.

GP-3. BUNKER
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-26 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1 24 PM 1967 ROYAN ANALYSIS BRANCH

Action assigned to

INFO: BANGKOK, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC, DA NANG BIEN HOA, NHA TRANG, CAN THO

Action taken

FROM : Amembassy SAIGON

DATE: July 13, 1967

Date of Action

Action Office Symbol

Name of Officer

SUBJECT : The Upper House Elections

REF : A. Saigon A-778, 6/23/67 C. Saigon 84, 7/1/67
B. SAIGON 29260, 6/30/67 D. Saigon 430, 7/6/67

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. Summary

Viet-Nam's new Upper House will be elected on September 3, the same day Vietnamese voters will choose a President and Vice-President under the new Constitution. A large number of senatorial candidates have presented themselves from virtually every non-communist political tendency in the country, a welcome sign of political vitality. With over 600 candidates (60 ten-man lists plus alternates) currently in the race for 60 Upper House seats, the choice being offered the Vietnamese elector may even be too varied and confusing. Random voting is likely to be high and odds favor slates with already well-known and not-disliked names. Because of the sophistication required to express a meaningful preference for one or more Upper House slates, urban, particularly Saigon, voters are likely to have disproportionate influence in the selection of Senators. The Upper House race has generated considerable enthusiasm in political circles here. The field reads like a Who's Who in Vietnamese politics and attention focussed on these senatorial elections may well have the welcome side-effect of defusing tensions generated by the presidential race which is taking place at the same time. END SUMMARY.

2. Background

Provision for election of an Upper House is contained in Article 33 through 36 of the new Vietnamese Constitution, promulgated April 1, 1967. Article

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Drafted by: POL:JDNegroponte:LHRudle:eac 7-13-67

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:TMRecknagel

Clearances: POL:TJCHeavner

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33 provides that the Upper House includes from 30 to 60 members elected at large by list voting and on a basis of plurality. The size of lists, to be determined by law, can be set between one-third and one-sixth the size of the Upper House membership. Thus the possible size of senatorial lists ranges from 5-man lists in an Upper House with 30 members to 20-man lists in one with 60 members.

Article 33 of the Constitution also fixes the term of office of Senators at 6 years with one-half their number being re-elected every three years. Members of the first Upper House will draw lots to determine whose term of office expires after three years. Article 34 of the Constitution stipulates that, in addition to meeting qualifications required by Article 32 and by law, senatorial candidates must be 30 years-old on election day.

Legislation implementing these articles of the Constitution was drafted by the National Assembly during May and early June and was promulgated by the Directorate on June 15. The Upper House law sets membership of the Upper House at 60 and the size of senatorial lists, or slates, at 10. The law also provides that voters will be allowed to cast ballots for up to six lists, in other words to vote for the entire membership of the Upper House. (This provision is the result of an amendment by the Directorate. The National Assembly's original draft provided that voters would only be allowed to vote for one list as a safeguard against any one group or alliance dominating the Upper House. The Directorate insisted on the six list formula on the grounds that allowing voters to express a preference for only one list would be to deprive the voter of five-sixths of his right to vote.)

The effect of adoption of the six-list formula was to encourage many more lists to file their candidacies than would otherwise have been the case. There was, however, between promulgation of the election law on June 15 and the filing deadline of June 30 insufficient time for any group or alliance to put together six slates since most political organizations had, until the Directorate's amendment, thought in terms of fielding one or, at the most, two lists. Had there been more time to file, as many as 100 slates might have done so.

Allowing the voter to cast ballots for up to six lists also poses certain practical problems both for the voter and the Special Commissariat for Administration which is charged with the task of providing administrative support for the elections. If on election day there are, for example, 50 senatorial lists still in the race, the voter will be handed 50 ballots

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as he walks into the polling booth from which he may select up to six to deposit in the ballot box. This process is likely to be slow and cumbersome except for relatively small percentage of the electorate which will have firmly decided beforehand how it plans to vote. One current estimate is that it will take each voter an average of 7 minutes to select the senatorial ballots of his choice. Handling of such a large number of ballots could also lead to a rather high percentage of invalid votes.

The practical problem confronting the Special Commissariat for Administration is simply one of printing up enough ballots for the senatorial and presidential elections and assuring their delivery to an estimated 7,000 polling stations prior to election day. One serious obstacle has already been overcome by securing the Directorate's and the Assembly's concurrence in a modification of senatorial ballots. Had the original ballot specifications stipulated by the election law been retained, ballots could not have been printed in time for the election. Difficulties nonetheless remain and, to illustrate them, Special Commissioner for Administration Nguyen van Tuong in a press interview on July 2 said that, if all 17 presidential and 64 senatorial slates which had filed actually ran, 648 million ballots weighing 1,250 tons would have to be printed. Tuong went on to estimate that 500 Dakota airplanes or 250 trucks would be needed to get the ballots out to polling stations. Despite the difficulties involved, Tuong expressed confidence that his commissariat, and local printers, could cope with the problem. (Tuong's confidence notwithstanding, the VNAF has already requested, and will receive, limited USAF assistance in transporting blank ballots.)

3. Appeal of the Upper House

One might ask why so many Vietnamese politicians are in the Upper House race. Three reasons are most apparent. First, as mentioned above, the election is being taken seriously in political circles. Unlike the case of the Constituent Assembly, the prospect of being a Senator represents a chance for candidates to have a voice in national affairs for at least 3 and perhaps many more years to come. Second, many Vietnamese view the future Upper House as likely to be the more prestigious and powerful of the National Assembly's two chambers. They consider it more prestigious because it will be smaller than the Lower House and more powerful because, under the provisions of Article 43 of the Constitution, it will have the right to propose changes to legislation drafted by the Lower House. If the Lower House cannot override the Upper House's point of view by a majority of two-thirds of its membership, then the position of the Upper House will be adopted.

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4. The Candidates

The election law provided that candidacies had to be filed in list form with the Special Commissariat for Administration by mid-night June 30. This deadline was retained despite some pressure to extend it because the law had been promulgated only two weeks before. The Commissariat did, however, extend to mid-night July 7 the deadline for submission of supporting documents required of candidates by Article 14 of the election law (birth certificates, police records, symbols of the slate, etc.).

The short period of time permitted for filing occasioned a great deal of last minute scrambling by senatorial hopefuls. There were candidates, who on the morning of June 30, were still placing frantic phone calls to put the finishing touches on the composition of their lists; and yet others, who abandoned by one list, were trying to get in on someone else's or start a new one of their own. Close to half of the slates did not file until June 30.

In all 64 slates totalling 640 candidates and 81 alternates filed. Not all will stay in the race. As of July 10 four lists had already withdrawn or been eliminated for insufficient documentation (lists number 33, 51, 57 and 64) and others may be expected to drop out or be eliminated during the screening process which ends July 20. A fair guess would be that 40 or so lists will be in the race on election day, in other words, a ratio of roughly 7 candidates for every Upper House seat.

From an analysis of the 721 persons who initially filed for the Upper House race, it is easy to conclude that the senatorial election is being taken seriously by important politicians of every tendency in and out of the government. Included among the candidates are 62 of the present 116 Assembly deputies, 5 civilian members of the Directorate, 34 of the present 70 members of the Peoples-Army Council, 29 provincial and municipal councillors and five retired generals. (Some of these occupations overlap.) Significantly, several slates are connected with groups which boycotted the Constituent Assembly elections of September, 1966, an added indication that considerable importance is attached to this election not to mention confidence that it will take place.

In addition, a number of leaders of trade unions and other voluntary associations have posed their candidacies. This large number of people with avowedly political occupations can be said to represent a significant change from days when Vietnamese politics tended to be conducted solely by government officials, notables and persons engaged in the liberal professions.

Analyzing the candidates by ethnic and regional origin, there are 281 Vietnamese born from Thanh Hoa province on north and 13 from Thanh Hoa south to the 17th parallel, for a total of 294 Northern refugees. There are 119 Vietnamese born in South Central Viet-Nam (here defined as areas now covered by I and coastal II Corps) who, together with the 13 North Central Vietnamese, makes a total of 132 Central Vietnamese. 249 of the Vietnamese candidates were born in the III and IV Corps areas. There are 37 minority candidates and alternates (25 Chinese, 7 Cambodians and 5 Montagnards). There are 22 candidates whose origins we do not yet know. Most lists contain representatives from two or three of the main Vietnamese regional groups and few appeal directly to one regional group to the exclusion of others.

Approximately 85 percent of the candidates who filed listed a residence in the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh area. This reflects the concentration of politics in the capital region. Another reason for the concentration of candidates from the Saigon area was probably the shortness of time between promulgation of the election law and the filing deadline which gave the advantage to those with easy access to other politicians with whom they could make up lists.

5. The Slates

With such a large field it is difficult to predict with any degree of certainty which slates are most likely to win. In addition to public recognition and organizational support, an important factor affecting the outcome of the Upper House election is apt to be the degree to which leading presidential candidates publicly associate their names with certain senatorial lists. Such open associations between presidential and senate slates have not yet emerged. In the meanwhile it is possible to identify about 20 slates which, because of probable strong support from political blocs or because of the popular figures appearing on them, can be characterized as the most important ones. The following is a brief description of these 20 lists together with short explanations of why we consider them important:

a) List 2, "Greater National Unity," is headed by Secretary of State for Handicraft and Industry, former deputy, and former Chairman of the Saigon Capital Council La thanh Nghe. This list also has Hoa Hao leaders Bui van Manh, Le phuoc Sang and Le quang Liem; Montagnard deputy Col. Dam van Quy, Cambodian deputy Thach Sung, Cao Dai deputy Nguyen huu Luong, Chinese congregation chief Khoang trong Vinh,

Southern Catholic Peoples-Army Council member Huynh kim Nen, and Northern Major and PAC member Nguyen dang Hai. This list includes a number of well known elected officials. It represents a broad cross-section of ethnic and regional groups. Most of its members have in the past cooperated closely with the GVN and this may result in support from the Thieu-Ky slate during the campaign.

b) List 3, "United for Progress," is headed by former Ambassador to Australia and former Chairman of Diem's National Assembly Tran van Lam, and includes other well-known figures from the Diem era. Other familiar names are former Information Minister Tran chanh Thanh, former Assembly Deputy and wife of the Education Commissioner Mrs. Pauline Nguyen van Tho, and well-known attorney Nguyen van Chuc. This slate is likely to benefit from the financial support of Diemist elements.

c) List 5, "Strength and Progress," is headed by the First Deputy Chairman of the Peoples-Army Council and Chief of the RVNAF Medical Directorate, Col. Dr. Vu ngoc Hoan, and it includes four other members of the PAC -- three young Northern military officers and the Second Deputy Chairman, Central Catholic Judge Nuynh duc Buu. Connections in the Army and the GVN could work to the advantage of this list.

d) List 8, "Greater Solidarity," is the list of the (Northern Catholic) Greater Solidarity Force, headed by its Secretary-General (and PAC member) Nguyen gia Hien. Although most of the slate is not well known, the list is likely to benefit from the explicit endorsement of Catholic priests.

e) List 12, "Service to Society," is the list backed by the Thich Tam Chau faction of the Vien Hoa Dao. Cambodian Therevada Buddhist leader and PAC member Son thai Nguyen is head of the list and Nguyen cao Thanh, official of the World Buddhist Association, is number two; there are also three National Assembly deputies on the list.

f) List 13, "Farmer, Worker, Soldier," is headed by retired General Tran van Don, and includes retired General Ton that Dinh, National Assembly deputy Tran Dien, FULRO deputy Ksor Rot and Deputy and Mandarin Dai Viet leader Dang van Sung. This list is likely to have widespread appeal.

g) List 17, "People's Progress," is headed by Foreign Minister Dr. Tran van Do and includes former Deputy Prime Minister Tran van Tuyen, PAC member and former Cabinet member Tran thanh Hiep, Caravellist Dr. Nguyen tien Hy, and PAC member Mrs. Le thi An. This list will

benefit from the prestige of Dr. Do who, apart from Prime Minister Ky, is probably the Cabinet member best known to the Vietnamese people.

h) List 22, "Sheaf of Rice," is a Revolutionary Dai Viet Party list including five deputies, notably Greater Peoples bloc leader Professor Nguyen van Ngai. Lists number 23, 24, and 25 ("Rice Harvest," "Stalk of Rice" and "Bundle of Rice") will also receive the support of the Revolutionary Dai Viet party organization.

i) List 30, "Peace and Prosperity," is the strongest entry by the Movement for the Renaissance of the South (MRS), and is headed by former Secretary of State for Education and present Chairman of the Southern Alumni Association Nguyen van Truong, with MRS leader and former Secretary of State for Youth Vo long Trieu in second position. Deputies Do Ai and Phan chau Tuan and National Youth Council President Tran ngoc Bau add further strength to the list; Ton that Thien, Publisher of the banned Viet-Nam Guardian, is an alternate. It is quite certain that this list will identify itself with presidential candidate Tran van Huong. List 29, "Peace and Prosperity" is another MRS entry.

j) List 31, which does not yet have a title, is headed by well-known Southern journalist and Van Hanh University professor Ho huu Tuong, and includes three deputies: Tran van Phien, Huynh thanh Duc, and Nguyen van Hung. Tuong is popular in militant Buddhist circles. List 27, "Unity," headed by Tri Quang's physician, Dr. Nguyen duy Tai, is also likely to appeal to Buddhist voters.

k) List 34, "Lotus," has a number of Buddhists who are well known in the Saigon area, as well as leading members of other groups. It includes former Saigon Capital Council Chairman Nguyen quy Bao and Councilman Phan Ngo, Deputy Prefect for Security Lt. Col. Nhu Ngoc, Director-General of Supply Lt. Col. Tran do Cung, Chinese deputies Diep van Hung and Trieu sen Hoach, Cambodian leader Maj. Kim Khanh, Cao Dai deputy Truong minh Chieu and Khanh Hoa deputy Hoang ngoc Can.

l) List 35, "Righteous Progress," is headed by Central Vietnamese VNQDD Directorate member Phan Khoang and includes deputy Dinh thanh Chau and several members of the PAC. It is likely to get Catholic support and has been mentioned by a number of sources as a slate likely to receive Directorate support.

m) List 37, "Viet-Nam Sun," is headed byretired Central Catholic General Huynh van Cao and includes retired General Nguyen van Chuan, and deputies Truong tien Dat and Vong a Sang. This list is likely to have appeal in the I Corps area.

n) List 38, "Security," is headed by Hoa Hao Directorate member Huynh van Nhiem and includes Viet-Nam Press Director-General and Prime Minister Ky's assistant Nguyen ngoc Linh. Deputies Nguyen van Hoi, Nguyen van Hoan, Vo Bao, and Le tai Hoa and PAC members Nguyen hoa Minh, Lam ngoc Thach, and Nguyen Long give the ticket added strength among the Hoa Hao and other elements who have joined together in the Assembly as members of the Democratic Alliance bloc.

o) List 39, "Charity and Justice," is headed by Directorate member Tran van An and includes Van Phu, well-known Hoa Hao leader. Both lists 38 and 39 are prospective beneficiaries of support from the Thieu-Ky presidential slate.

p) List 45, "Worker-Farmer," is led by the Secretary-General of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor, Tran huu Quyen, and is composed entirely of labor leaders.

q) List 46, "Peaceful," will have the support of veterans organizations and strong appeal to Central Viet-Nam. It includes PAC member Nguyen Tuong Ba, Assistant to the Premier for Public Relations Dr. Nguyen huu Chi (who is also former Quang Nam Province Chief), Viet-Nam Veterans Legion Secretary-General Col. Pham do Thanh, and Central VNQDD deputy Le nguyen Long.

r) List 47, "Prosperous Peace," isheaded by Mrs. Tran van Van, widow of the late Southern regionalist leader, and it includes some members of the Movement for the Renaissance of the South as well as Van's personal following of older Southern radicals.

s) List 53, "New Generation," is a group of young and mostly Northern military officers: the most prominent name is that of PAC Secretary-General Lt. Col. Pham ngoc Loi who is close personally to the Prime Minister.

t) List 61, "Honest Trust," is headed by retired Lt. Gen. Le van Nghiem and includes deputies Vo huu Thu, Tang Cuu and Nguyen thanh Vinh. It has a strong appeal to Central Viet-Nam and is likely to receive considerable Buddhist support from that area.

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TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK, CINCPAC, VIENTIANE

FROM : Amembassy SAIGON

DATE: July 13, 1967

SUBJECT : Campaign Platform of Presidential Candidate Au Truong Thanh

REF : CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. Former Economy Minister and presidential candidate Au Truong Thanh is the only candidate who has thus far geared his campaign propaganda uniquely to the issue of peace. Hardly a day goes by that Thanh does not issue a tract or mimeographed letter on the subject. Invariably accompanied by a rather expert English translation, Thanh's campaign literature is delivered regularly to foreign embassies and press agencies.

2. On July 7 Thanh circulated a tract entitled Approach to the Notion of Peace in a Revolutionary War. A full translation is submitted as an enclosure to this airgram. It is a comprehensive statement of the principal thesis which Thanh intends to advance to the Vietnamese electorate, if, in fact, he is allowed to run. (A complaint has been filed against Thanh's candidacy on grounds that he is pro-communist and there is a good chance that he will be disqualified as a candidate by the National Assembly.) It is perhaps most noteworthy for its communist argument and terminology, though the final conclusions are not communist.

Enclosure:

1. Approach to the Notion of Peace in a Revolutionary War.

GROUP 3
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Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:TMRecknagel

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3. Briefly stated, Thanh's thesis is that there is no satisfactory military solution to the Viet-Nam war. It is a war of attrition and escalation which will ultimately result in the complete destruction of Viet-Nam and/or world war. Having thus concluded that armed conflict is futile, Thanh asserts that the only way to move away from war and closer to peace is to promote the desire for peace within the population. Properly and sufficiently stimulated, the desire for peace will diminish support for armed struggle, thus reducing the military capability of the "revolutionaries." "The machine opposing the revolutionary war will also have to follow suit. Then favorable conditions for negotiations for a cease-fire and for peace will prevail." Thanh concludes that the Vietnamese people "must be assisted to express themselves in favor of peace and to transform the presidential elections into a large referendum on the fundamental issue of peace and war."

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APPROACH TO THE NOTION OF PEACE

IN A REVOLUTIONARY WAR

By Au Truong-Thanh

Viet-Nam is the typical example of a revolutionary war. The duration of this war has enabled us to see the successive steps of an evolution, through the different phases of a development which had been conditioned by internal and external circumstances.

Till now, all the efforts made to break or to stop the war were proven ineffective. Resort to violence which is normal in a conventional war had been used in vain. Pathetic appeals trying to stir humanitarian feelings have been launched but also in vain. Offers of assistance with the lure of material advantages also are not responded as expected.

All these attempts not only fail but also spread a climate of mistrust, of discouragement and of impotence in the face of war actions which, day by day, are becoming more intensified.

Why so? Because of the lack of time for an analysis of the facts with due consideration to the genuine opinions of the nationals of the country in which the war is being waged.

It is now the due time to bridge this gap and to find in a rational way, an approach to the notion of peace within the content of a revolutionary war.

First of all, let us analyse the factors which were at the start of a revolutionary war. Human being is at the hub of the revolutionary war and he has to be a native of the country where the revolutionary war has to be waged. At the beginning, one must find all possible resources in order to influence him psychologically so that he will grab leaflets or weapons necessary to initiate the political and armed struggle. Propaganda tools utilized by human beings are but of minor importance, for a man driven by a powerful motivation can achieve a lot with very crude equipment indeed. The elements of motivation can achieve a lot with very crude equipment indeed. The elements of motivation which a man to fight for a liberation war are numerous but they can be enumerated in the following order: the loss of national independence, dissatisfaction due to the social injustice, bad living conditions. If these components do not really exist, they must be fabricated as needed.

Generally speaking, it takes some time to start a revolutionary war because the simple and primitive peasantry can be politically transformed only under particular circumstances and with time. In practice,

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the circumstances the most conducive to a rapid and violent explosion of a revolutionary war can be found in the negative attitude of the colonizing power which refuses to grant genuine independence to the colonized people, a fact that crystalizes all the will for liberation of the people.

In the case of Viet-Nam, the mechanism had been launched by the armed struggle to regain national independence. Once the mechanism has been launched, the process of development of the liberation war went on a self-feeding system because a war waged on a larger scale strengthens the factors found at the start of a revolutionary war. In effect, an ideological war with foreign intervention that follows the war for independence does worsen the thirst for national sovereignty. Also the war, in alienating the city folks from the farmers causes more social injustice and at the same time, creates among cities folks a widening gap between war profiteers and war sufferers and thus aggravates a dangerous social unbalance. Finally, the war and the destruction it entails, the exodus and displacement of people it creates cause a steady deterioration of material living conditions the least viable in a developing country and therefrom rise the resentment of people and their desire to see a change of regime.

Thus, if the movement of the revolutionary war encounters an opposition by its action, this opposition will be enhanced by the reaction as powerful as the force exerted by the movement itself; it in turn initiates a more violent opposition and starts to snowball. In this way, in the action and reaction interplay with the reciprocal feeding effect, a development process takes place inexorably with the cumulative result with no end in sight.

Two hypotheses are to be considered: (1) Either the machinery opposing the revolutionary war is not strong enough and in the above-mentioned motion of crescendo, the time will surely come when that machinery will be overrun by what is called the "General counter-offensive," (2) Or the machine opposing the revolutionary war is assisted from without and in such a case the interplay of actions and reactions will go on for a long time unless in the prolonged course of events, the fighting machine wears out; if it does, the end will be that of the first hypothesis, or unless under horrible circumstances it is decided to completely destroy the country where the war is waged. Even in such a case, the revolutionary war will not be wiped out as much for as long as human beings are stilled moved by strong political motivations, the revolutionary war will go on. It will be a war of attrition, the end of which can only be met in a world war.

If the above analysis is correct, then we will have to deny the possibility of peace in the course of a revolutionary war and let ourselves sink into pessimism. But we feel that one possibility of peace and only

one does exist. The approach being as follows:

We have said that the main factor in a revolutionary war is human being, that human being can perform prodigies when motivated by strong psychological incentives which lead him to political or armed struggle. If one can ever find a stronger psychological motivation which, under certain given conditions, can neutralize the others, then one can stop the war and move closer to peace.

What must those conditions be? First of all, the war has to last long enough so that asporations toward complete national independence, social justice and better living conditions will lose their attractive power they once had at the outset of the struggle; then they wear out with time and with mounting disillusions and disappointment. It is also necessary that the interplay of actions and reactions reach a significant equilibrium where the revolutionary war and its opposing forces can no longer negate, easily and quickly, the final decision.

Within this precise context, the powerful psychological motivation which can efficiently act on the human being is the desire for peace. This desire for peace has to come from the populace in question and can be, as the need arises, excited or blown up to embrace as many people as possible. The birth of this desire, amid an atmosphere of tough and prolonged war, coupled with the fear of death, will cut down or neutralize the effects of psychological motivation pushing toward the struggle. With the popular support without which revolution is not possible, now directed toward peace, the war itself will stop spreading then move downward. The machine opposing the revolutionary war will also have to follow suit. Then favorable conditions for negotiations for a cease-fire and for peace will prevail.

After long and painful years Viet-Nam now finds itself facing the above mentioned conditions. The Vietnamese people as the whole must be assited to express themselves in favor of peace and to transform the forthcoming presidential elections into a large referendum on the fundamental issue of peace and war.

It is an unique opportunity. It would be criminal to let it slip by without giving it a try.

SAIGON, the 7th of July, 1967

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1. NGUYEN HOA HIEP, ONE OF OTE GRAND OLD MEN UNOTE OF VNODD, CONFIDENTLY EXPECTS TO RECEIVE ABOUT ONE MILLION VOTES IN FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. HIS SOUTHERN REGION ORGANIZATION OF VNODD, WHICH HE CLAIMS IS STRONGEST ELEMENT OF PARTY IN SVN, IS FURTHER SUPPORTED, HE SAYS, BY HOA HAO IN III AND IV CORPS AREAS.

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2. CONVERSATIONS WITH HIEP, AND SEPARATELY WITH NGUYEN VAN SA, WHO IS ACTING AS HIEP'S CAMPAIGN MANAGER, REFLECT HIEP'S DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE WITH PROSECUTION OF WAR AND UNDERTAKE TOTAL REORGAINIZATION OF GVN. REGARDING WAR, BOTH HIEP AND SA APPEAR SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED THAT ARVN UNITS ARE BEING OTE RELEGARED UNOTE TO PACIFICATION ROLE AND FEEL THAT ARVN SHOULD BE GUARDING FRONTIERS AGAINST VC AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE RELUCTANTLY AGREED THAT ONLY VIETNAMESE CAN BE FULLY EFFECTIVE IN PACIFICATION ROLE. REGARDING REORGANIZATION OF GVN, NGUYEN VAN SA STATES THAT AS RESULT OF HIEP'S TENURE IN 1965 AS MINISTER OF INTERIOR, THEIR ORGANIZATION NOW HAS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION OOH GVN OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS AND WOULD BE IN POSITION TO MAKE CHAGES REQUIRED, BRINGING IN MANY VNODD TO POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY. NEITHER HEIP NOR SA HAS HAD MUCH TO SAY ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH NVN, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THIS SUBJECT WAS BEING CONSIDERED AS PART OF HIEP'S PLATFORM.

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3. NGUYEN VAN SA HAS VOLUNTEERED VIEW, IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, THAT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AU TRUONG THANH HAS LONG

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MARXIST RECORD WHICH SA FAMILIAR WITH FROM HIS DAYS IN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. SA HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THANH, WHO, HE ALLEGED, HAS CLOSE PERSONAL AND FAMILY CONTACTS IN HANOI, SHOULD BE TAKING PART IN ELECTIONS AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

4. COMMENT: HIEP'S TEAM APPEARS TO BE GROUP OF OLDER MEN WHO HAVE NEVER FACED UP TO COMPLEXITIES OF PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION AND TEND TO REVERE HIDD* AND WORK FOR HIM AS THEY DID 20(*) YEARS AGO WHEN HE WAS THEIR LEADER AS COMMANDER OF GUERRILLA UNIT WHICH OPPOSED FRENCH RETURN TO INDO-CHINA. HIEP HIMSELF IS VERY PROUND HE IS GRADUATE OF WHAMPOA MILITARY ACADEMY, WHERE HE WAS IN FOURTH CLASS TO GRADUATE. HE IS FRIENDLY WITH CHINESE NATIONALIST AMBASSADOR HU LIEN, WHO, HE PROUDLY NOTES, WAS ONLY IN SEVENTH CLASS TO GRADUATE FROM WHAMPOA.

5. ACCORDING TO MINISTRY OF NATIONAL SECURITY, HIEP'S PARTY ORGANIZATION IS ACTIVE IN SOUTHERN VIET-NAM, BUT HAS LIMITED MEMBERSHIP, MADE UP MOSTLY OF OLD MEN WHO HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO ATTRACT NEW BLOOD OR GENERATE NEW IDEAS. HIEP'S RUNNING MATE, MGUYEN THE TRUYEN, IS IN MUCH SAME MOLD, WE SEE LITTLE PROPECT THAT THE HIEP TICKET WILL HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT APPEAL.

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